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EX PARTE MMLLIGAN v. THE FIVE COMPANIES:
MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAIi*
JoHN P. FRANK
It has become the fashion in recent years to criticize the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan,' to suggest that
the decision was the production of an obsolete day and an outmoded
science of war, to assert that it is filled with irrelevant dicta. It is argued
that the Court did not mean what it said, or, if this is not so, that its
teaching should be ignored or overruled.2
It is the thesis of this article that those critics are wrong. EX parte
Milligan is one of the truly great documents of the American Constitu-
tion, a bulwark for the protection of the civil liberties of every American
citizen. It is the pledge of the Supreme Court to the people of the United
States that the constitutional right of freedom from arrest and punish-
ment at the caprice of the executive branch of the Government, partic-
ularly the military, and the right of trial by jury can never be taken away
so long as the courts are open and can function. There are no more im-
portant constitutional rights than these.
Lambdin P. Milligan was a Civil War Copperhead and probable
traitor to the North. He had never been in the armed forces of the
United States and had no official post in the government or in the Con-
federate Army. He was seized by the military authorities in 1864 and,
along with other alleged Confederate conspirators, was tried and sen-
tenced to death by a military commission sitting in Indianapolis. The
civil courts in Indiana were open and there was no reason why he could
not have been prosecuted in a civil court with trial by jury. In May,
1865, he and his fellow defendants petitioned for habeas corpus. In
* The author of this article was an employee of the Department of the Interior
during the period in which this article was written and its publication planned. How-
ever, the article does not purport to reflect the view, whether official or unofficial, of
any person other than its author and is exclusively an independent expression of
view.
1. 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
2. The Attorney General in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942) suggested
that the Milligan rule should be modified; FAIRMAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RuIE (2d
ed. 1942) 163 says: "It by no means follows that what appeared a salutary restraint/
upon the tyranny of the Stuarts is today an appropriate limit on the power of both
executive and legislature in a highly responsible national government"; WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920) 817 expresses the view that the,
minority opinion is sounder than the majority; King, Legality of Martial Law in
Hawaii (1942) 30 CALIF. L. REv. 599, 626, conceding that under the majority view
martial law in Hawaii is unconstitutional, suggests that perhaps the case will be
overruled. RANKIN, WHEN CivIL LAW FAILS (1939) 183, states the law sub-
stantially in accordance with the Milligan rule, and quotes a number of commen-
tators pro and con.
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April, 1866, the Supreme Court handed down opinions unanimously
holding for the petitioners.3 Two opinions were filed, one subscribed by
five and the other by four members of the Court. It is the opinion of the
majority by Mr. Justice Davis over which the controversy rages and it is
this opinion that has become and will be referred to as "the opinion" in
the Milligan case.
Justice Davis held that the military authorities had not complied
with the terms of the statute suspending the writ. He went on, however,
to discuss the invalidity of the military action on any theory. The opinion
is so forcefully and passionately written that its spirit can only be gained
by full reading; but the core of the argument is this: The Constitution
guarantees trial by jury and establishes many safeguards in judicial pro-
ceedings. "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. ' '4 The
laws of war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld
the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed. This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana
the Federal authority was always unopposed and its courts always open
to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war
could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever of a citizen
in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. Congress
could grant no such power; . . ."5 Justice Davis then examines the
necessities of the situation-"The necessity must be actual and present"
-and concludes that Milligan could only be prosecuted in the civil courts.
If this is not so, ". . . Republican government is a failure. . . . Civil
liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together; the antago-
nism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must perish." 7
The Constitution permits suspension of the writ. "It does not say after a
writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise
than by the course of the common law." s As soon as the courts can func-
tion, martial law ceases to exist: "Martial rule can never exist where the
courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction."
In the minority opinion Chief Justice Chase concurred in holding
that the conviction was illegal under the statute. However, he challenged
3. For a full history of the Milligan case, see KLAUS, THE MILLIGAN CASE(1929) ; FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1939) c. 4.
4. 4 Wall. at 120-121.
5. Id. at 121-122.
6. Id. at 127.
7. Id. at 124-5.
8. Id. at 126.
9. Id. at 127.
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the majority contention that Congress could not authorize trials by niili-
tary commissions though the courts were open. He argued that when
the nation was at war, when some areas have been invaded and others
may be, it is within Congressional power to determine where such im-
minent public danger exists as justifies. trials by military tribunals. He
suggested that in some instances Congress may not have confidence in
the courts, although they be open.
The majority opinion in substance lays down certain explicit rules
concerning the jurisdiction of military courts in wartime. They may be
stated thus:
1. The writ of habeas corpus may under certain circumstances be
suspended in wartime, as for example, to permit necessary preventive,
detention. o
2. However, this does not mean that once habeas corpus is sus-
pended, a citizen loses his right to trial in the civil courts if he is to be
tried at all.
3. A person not otherwise subject to the laws of war' ° is not subject
to the jurisdiction of military courts upon suspension of the writ or
declaration of martial law unless absolutely necessary. The civil courts
shall judge that necessity.
4. Military trials of such persons will not be considered necessary
"where the courts are open and their process unobstructed."
The Open Court rule thus announced by the Supreme Court in
1866 was as old as American law.11
10. This qualification "not otherwise subject to the laws of war" is important.
A person may be subject to the jurisdiction of military courts although the civil
courts are open and functioning if he is charged with an offense which is tradi-
tionally within the military jurisdiction. Examples are members of the armed
forces of the United States or foreign spies or invaders, as in the case of Ex parteQuirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). The Quirin case in no sense limits the Milligan doc-
trine, since the petitioners in Quiri were a small enemy force invading this coun-
try for purposes of sabotage and were, as the Court unanimously held, traditionally
subject to the law of war.
11. In 1691 the legislature of South Carolina passed an act with the following
preface: "WHEREAs, Lieut. Col. Ste. Bull, Major Charles Colleton, Paul Grim-
ball, Esq. together with Landgrave James Colleton, late Governor of this part of
the Province, did make articles of warr and erect and establish Martiall Law, and
the same cause to be published at the head of every company of the militia of this
part of the Province, under the paines of death and other penaltys as in the said
articles is sett downe and required, and the same did enforce and put in execution
against divers of theire Majesties peaceable subjects inhabiting in this province,
to the apparent breach of libertys, propertys and privileges, and to the dread and
terrour of theire Majesty's subjects, notwithstanding at the time there was noe
appearance of any forraigne invasion or any domestick rebellion, tumult or sedition,
and that at the samne tynte all the Courts of Justice were opened and alwayes after
continued to be so. . . ." [Emphasis addedi. It was therefore enacted that none
of the persons named could for two years hold any civil or' military office in the
colony. Act of March 25, 1691, No. 58, 2 COOPER (1836) 49. For discussion of the
incident which gave rise to the act, see 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PEIOD OF AMER-
ICAx, HISTORY (1937) 231.
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Thus understood, it is difficult to see why the Open Court rule
should be criticized or declared incompatible with total war. It is true
that modern war is technologically different from the earlier wars. The
airplane "blitz" deep behind the enemy lines is not identical with J. E. B.
Stuart's or Phil Sheridan's raids, and the saboteurs perform a somewhat
different role from Major Andre. The Fifth Column may be distin-
guished, if you will, from the Copperheads and the Tories. But are the
differences so great, and if they are, is there any relevant significance in
the change? The question under the Milligan case is whether the courts
are open, not whether the enemy's speediest method of tran~portation is
an airplane or a horse. The Open Court rule is no mere mechanical test,
nor was it intended to be. The Milligan decision carefully emphasized
that the district court "needed no bayonets to protect it, and required no
military aid to execute its judgments."'12
It is hard to imagine what virtue there is in prosecution of a civilian
accused, for example of embezzlement from another civilian, before a
major sitting as a provost court rather than before a regularly appointed
judge. A civil court can function as easily, and, within the restrictions of
sound constitutional provisions, as quickly as a military court. There are
three major conceivable reasons for making exceptions to the Open Court
rule in areas in which civil government has not been utterly destroyed by
war:
1. that the area has not enough manpower avgilable to permit a
jury to function;
2. that the proceedings require a greater secrecy than even an im-
pounded civil record will permit;
3. that a jury in an area, for reasons of disloyalty, will not convict
the guilty and that a change of venue is impractical.
There are few, if any, incidents in American history which could
justify the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction on any of these grounds.
Today, in 1944, the problems of the Milligan rule emerge from the
recesses of the political scientist's library into the public forum. The
basic principles of civil liberty are once more at test in World War II-
this time in the administration of the law of Hawaii. Here the Milligan
rule is under the severest attack it has ever borne because for three years
the Territory of Hawaii has been ruled by a military group, administer-
ing drumhead justice to the civilian population for violations of the civil
law. This military government has been under attack in the courts of
12. 4 Wall. at 122; see WIENER, A PRAcTI cAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW
(1940) 106. For affirmation that the Milligan decision is a rule of substance and
not a mechanical formula, see CnARLEs E. HUGHES, WAR POWERS UNDER ThE
CONSTITUTION, SEN. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) 11, 12.
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Hawaii during the last two years, and two recent decisions by the federal
district judges in the cases of White13 and Duncan4 draw the issue
squarely: Is the Milligan rule to be the protection to the Americans of
the twentieth century that it was to the Americans of the nineteenth?
Discussion of these particular cases provides the simplest method of
drawing clear-cut issues: However, the cases must be considered against
a double background of the history of martial law since the Milligan de-
cision in 1866 and the history of Hawaii both before and since the inau-
guration of martial law. In the light of this background the reader can
decide whether the Milligan decision should either be considered inap-
plicable or a dead letter, as the military authorities contend,'5 or whether,
as the two district judges imply, the conviction of these two civilians for
civil offenses by miliary courts without trial by jury when the civil courts
were ready and able to function, was an outrage against American con-
stitutional government.
HAWAII BEiFORE PEARL HARBOR
To understand the itnpact of martial law on a social system it is nec-
essary to know something of what that social system is; and an appraisal
of martial law in Hawaii since Pearl Harbor requires some knowledge of
Hawaii before that time.' 6 The principal islands of Hawaii were first
13. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, McLaughlin, J., Habeas Cor-
pus 300, decided May 2, 1944.
14. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, Metzger, J., Habeas Corpus
298, decided April 13, 1944.
15. Colonel King, supra note 2, at 626.
16. General information on the history of Hawaii can be obtained from the
following sources: SEN. Doc. No. 178, Part 14, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897) (a
publication by the Bureau of American- Republics on Hawaii) ; SEN. Doc. No. 23,
55th Cong., 1st Sess. (1897) (a paper on Hawaii read before the National Geo-
graphic Society) ; SEN. REP. No. 227, 53rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1894) (report of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the relation of the United States to
the revolution of 1893 and the establishment of the Republic of Hawaii) ; Debates
in Congress on the Organic Act of Hawaii, 33 CONG. REc. 2022-33, 2316-29, 3702-15,
3800-22 (1900). The best history of the revolution and events leading to annexation is
PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898 (1936). More recent developments in Hawaii are con-
tained in CASTLE, HAWAII, PAST AND PRESENT (1931 ed.). BARBER, HAWAII:
RESTLESS RAMPART (1941), is a description of Hawaii with emphasis on the
economic control of the Islands. Shoemaker, Labor in Hawaii, H. R. Doc. No.
848, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940), is a report by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics on Hawaii. Other descriptive works are JARETT, HAWAII AND ITS PEOPLE(1933) ; CRAWFORD, PARADOX IN HAWAII (1933), which emphasizes education and
race relations; MESICK AND FARRINGTON, THE KINGDOM OF HAWAII (1934);
and Jones, Geography and Politics in the Hawaiian Islands (1938) 28 GEOGRAPH-
ICAL REVIEW 193. The government of Hawaii from a mechanical standpoint is
described in LITTLER, THE GOVERNANCE OF HAWAII (1929), and in two publica-
tions of the University of Hawaii: VITOUSEK, FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF
GOVERNMENT IN HAWAIr (1935), and GEORGE AND BACHMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF
HAWAII (1932). See also HAWAIIAN BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, OUR
TERRITORIAL GOvERNMENT (1937). An excellent recent survey of Hawaii in terms of
its economic, social, and military problems is Hawaii: Sugar Coated Fort, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE, August, 1940, p. 31.
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discovered and named the Sandwich Islands by Captain James Cook in
1778. At that time the Islands were governed as separate principalities
by separate rulers, but in 1795 King Kamehameha I extended dominion
over the group. Thereafter the Islands were visited from time to time by
traders and in 1820 the first missionaries arrived. These missionaries in
many cases remained as businessmen. Two of them, Amos Cooke and
Samuel Castle, became the founders of one of the principal commercial
companies in the Islands today, Castle & Cooke. Throughout the nine-
teenth century representatives of several nations competed for the most
influential position in the Islands but eventually the American group
prevailed. Americans developed the sugar and pineapple industries and
in due course five major companies, which began as sugar factors, became
the controlling economic force in the Islands. In 1893 the American
group conducted a successful revolution against the monarchy and estab-
lished a republic. The Republic immediately petitioned for annexation
by the United States, and was annexed during the Spanish-American
War in 1898. In 1900 the Hawaiian Organic Act'7 was passed by Con-
gress.
In order to maintain an adequate labor supply, the plantation owners
imported labor on a contract basis, principally from Japan and the Philip-
pine Islands. These laborers came in great numbers, quickly outnumber-
ing the native population.'5 They were hired on a contract basis which
was little better than slavery, and the debates in Congress on the passage
of the Organic Act in 1900 are replete with tales of extreme brutalities
suffered by the contract workers.10 The original draft of the Organic
Act, prepared by a group of representatives of the former Hawaiian Re-
public, including Sanford B. Dole, and a group of Congressmen, per-
mitted continuance of the contract-labor system, but this was forbidden
by the Congress.2"
The development of Hawaii since 1900 is the story of the develop-
ment of the sugar, pineapple, and tourist industries under the control of
the Five Companies. These companies, by a system of interlocking mar-
riages and directorates have kept economic and political dominion of the
Islands among a small group of families. When the Organic Act was
passed, it was accepted without question that Hawaii was to be governed
by a "ruling class" of approximately 4,000 Americans and other Anglo-
17. 31 STAT. 141 (1900), 48 U. S. C. § 491 (1940).
18. In 1902, for example, out of 42,000 workers on the sugar plantations, 31,-
000 were Japanese, 4,000 Chinese, 2,700 Portuguese, 2,000 Puerto Rican, and only
about 1,500 were Hawaiian or part Hawaiian. In later years many of the
Japanese returned to Japan or left the sugar fields and their places were taken by
the Filipinos. Shoemaker, supra note 16, at 34.
19. 33 CONG. REc. 2320 et seq., 3712-3713 (1900).
20. 31 STAT. 143 (1900), 48 U. S. C. §§ 502, 503, 504 (1940).
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Saxon peoples who were to have dominion over the remaining 145,000
residents of the Islands. Particular provisions of the basic law were
specifically described by Senator Platt, who favored those provisions, as
aimed at maintenance of the "governing class." 2' In the intervening 44
years, the Islands have grown to 450,000 people, but the controlling
group has maintained its dominion. That controlling group built up th
industries of the Islands and in return dominated the Territory.22 The
unity of economic control may be seen most vividly by a 'omparison of
the interlocking directorates and top management of one of the Five
Companies with the remainder of Hawaiian industry. This company's
officers and directors occupy similar positions in twenty-eight sugar
plantations, three irrigation companies, three other of the Big Five con-
cerns, three banks, five public utilities, four pineapple companies, two
steam navigation companies, two newspapers, two insurance companies,
and seventeen other miscellaneous concerns. The total capitalization of
those enterprises is far over $100,000,000.23
Labor unions have led a precarious existence in an economy which
is still only a short forty years removed from almost pure feudalism.
The attitude of the employing group has been described by a dispassion-
ate observer as "benevolently paternalistic," and the history of Hawaiian
management is said to be "one of antagonism to labor organization." 24
Important plantation strikes occurred in 1919, 1920, in 1924 when
Philippine workers struck for a $2.00, 8 hour day, and again in 1937.
Non-plantation organization received its first impetus from the Wagner
Act and according to one estimate there were only 500 persons in the
Territory affiliated with national unions in 1935. In 1939 there were be-
tween 3,500 and 6,000 union members.25 However, acceptance of the
Wagner Act came slowly and the President of the Hawaiian Industrial
Association was quoted in 1937 as saying that he "paid as little attention
to the Wagner Act as he did to the Desha bathing suit law.' 26
21. 33 CONG. REc. 2024 (1900).
22. For description of. the domination of Hawaiian life by a handful of per-
sons see BARBER, HAWAII: REsTmss RAMPART (1941) generally and particularly
c. 2, "The Big Five"; for a proud account of the accomplishments of Hawaiian
industry, see CASTLE, HAWAII, PAST AND PRESENT (1931 ed.) c. 5. For a fur-
ther account of the Big Five see Hawaii: Sugar Coated Fort, spra note 8. The
Five Companies are Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, American Factors, C.
Brewer & Co., and Thos. H. Davies & Co.
23. This relation is charted in Shoemaker, supra note 16, at 197.
24. Id. at 198. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, supra note 16, describes Hawaiian eco-
nomic government as "paternalistic sdmi-feudalism" [at 81], and quotes Ray Stan-
nard Baker as having said of Hawaii, "I have rarely visited any place where there
is so much Charity and so little Democracy as in Hawaii."
25. Shoemaker, supra note, 16, c. 26. For an illuminating analysis of employ-
ment practices, with special emphasis on race relations problems, see ADAMS &
KAI, THE EDUCATION OF THE Boys OF HAWAII AND THEIR EcoNomIc OuTLOOK
(1928), a publication of the University of Hawaii.
26. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, smpra note 16, at 78.
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The relations of labor, the Big Five, the police, and the Army are well
described in a 1937 report of a National Labor Relations Board trial ex-
aminer in a case involving one of the Big Five and the Longshoremen's
Union:
"No impartial person who observed the demeanor of witnesses on the
stand and who heard the testimony and read the record and all of the exhibits
offered at the hearing, could fail io be impressed with the fact that the long-
shoremen in the employ of respondents are afraid and they have reason to be.
Their employer controls virtually the entire economic life of the Territory.
To be discharged as a longshoreman at the Port of Honolulu means either
that one must eke out a living fishing or go as a suppliant to one of the other
enterprises owned by Castle & Cooke, Ltd., and seek employment. If one
makes a remark that reflects in any manner on Castle & Cooke, Ltd., it is
sure to get back to the management and one is called on the carpet for it. An
employee must remember this even when seeking relaxation in drink, for his
irresponsible statements made under the influence of liquor are reported and
he is penalized just as if they were made when sober. The police department
works with respondent to check any untoward activity and this is well under-
stood. Moreover, the Army Intelligence cooperates with the Industrial Asso-
ciation of Hawaii, and the latter, in turn, is managed by an attorney for Re-
spondent, Castle and Cooke, Ltd....
"The mores of the Territory provide no place for a union of any of its
employed inhabitants, and consequently activity in looking toward such union
organization and moves made toward it which are commonplace on the main-
land become endowed with portentous and revolutionary significance when
seen through island eyes. It is not a healthy condition .
It was this Hawaii, a paternalist's paradise, which the Japanese
bombs struck on December 7, 1941.
CHRONOLOGY OF MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII
One of Governor Poindexter's first acts after the bombing was to
issue a proclamation under Section 67 of the Organic Act of Hawaii28
suspending habeas corpus, declaring martial law, and asking the military
commander of the area to take necessary steps for the protection of the
Islands. The proclamation authorized the general "during the present
emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed", to exercise
judicial power. The Governor's order was promptly approved by the
President in accordance with the Organic Act. The commanding gen-
eral then issued a proclamation and General Order No. 4 declaring him-
self military governor, an assumption of title utterly without authority
in law. He suspended all proceedings in civil courts and declared that the
27. Report of Trial Examiner George Pratt, In the Matter of Honolulu Long-
shoremen's Association and Castle and Cooke, Ltd., and Honolulu Stevedores
(National Archives, 1937) 35.
28. 31 STAr. 153 (1900), 48 U. S. C. § 532 (1940).
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military commissions and provost courts had general jurisdiction to try
offenses against the laws of the United States and of Hawaii. Thereafter
the following events occurred:
1. On December 8, the Supreme Court of Hawaii closed all Terri-
torial courts under "direction of the Commanding General."
2. On December 16, the military authorities issued General Order
No. 29 remitting certain jurisdiction to the civil courts in condemnation,
probate, and equity cases but barring subpoenas, the application of the
writs of mandamus and habeas corpus, jury trials in civil actions, and all
criminal proceedings. The military thus retained control of all cases in
the outcome of which they had any conceivable interest.
3. On January 27, 1942, General Order No. 57 was issued continu-
ing the prohibition against trial by jury, grand jury proceedings and any
criminal jurisdiction except for limited types of pending cases. It also
denied the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus. Actions against
men in the armed services or essential industry were forbidden.
4. On February 20, 1942, Federal Judge Metzger announced his
opinion in the case of Zimmerman who was detained without charge by
the military authorities and petitioned for habeas corpus. Judge Metzger
declined to grant the writ (though he thought the law required it) be-
cause he thought himself under "duress" by the military.29
5. On March 21, 1942, the act of Congress requested by the War
Department authorizing issuance of general defense regulations in mili-
tary areas, violations of which were to be prosecuted in the civil courts,
became law.30
6. In August 1942, the Departments of War, Justice, and Interiors'
held conversations concerning restoration of civil courts' jurisdiction. An
agreement was reported to the President on August 28. The result of
these negotiations were General Orders 133 and 135, continuing military
jurisdiction over offenses directed against the government and violations
of the orders of the military governor and continuing the suspension of
the writ. Certain other jurisdiction not relevant here was also retained
by the military tribunals.
7. On August 20, 1942, White was arrested and on August 25, he
was tried by a military commission and sentenced to five years imprison-
ment.
29. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the refusal
to grant the writ, one judge dissenting, Ex parte Zimmerman, 132 F.(2d) 442
(1943) and the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the case had become moot due to the release of the petitioners on the Main-
land. 319 U. S. 744 (1943).
30. 56 STAT. 173 (1942), 18 U. S. C. §97(a) (Supp. 1943).
31. The Department of the Interior is the branch of the Federal Government
responsible for administration of the territories.
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8. General Orders 133 and 135 were not satisfactory to the Depart-
ments of Justice and Interior and negotiations were continued through-
out the winter resulting in the agreement of February 8, 1943. Under
this agreement, which was approved by the President, joint proclama-
tions were issued by the Governor and General Emmons, the purported 2
effect of which was to continue the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus and a state of martial law. Jurisdiction of the courts was reestab-
lished in full except in cases of criminal and civil suits against persons
in the armed forces and except for "criminal prosecutions for violations
of military orders." These proclamations took effect on March 10. At
the same time a revised code of military orders was published, one sec-
tion of which made it a violation of a military order to commit assault
and battery against military or naval personnel in relation to the duties
of such personnel. 33
9. In July 1943, two persons, Glockner and Seifert, held by the
military authorities without charge, petitioned Judge Metzger for habeas
corpus. After prolonged difficulties in the course of which the Com-
manding general refused to acknowledge the writ and was fined for con-
tempt by the Judge, a fine which was later substantially remitted, the
prisoners were released on the mainland. 34
THE White AND Duncan CASES
On August 20, 1942, White, a citizen civilian employed in a Hono-
lulu brokerage house, was arrested by the provost marshal for embezzle-
ment. The offense had nothing to do with military affairs and the charge
was based on Territorial law. White was held in custody until August
22, when he was brought before a provost court and was orally informed
of the charges against him. Various motions, including a request for jury
trial and for time to prepare a defense, were overruled. He was tried and
convicted on August 25 and given a five year sentence, later reduced to
four years by the military governor. In April 1944, White petitioned
for habeas corpus before Federal judge McLaughlin who, on May 2,
filed an opinion granting the writ. judge McLaughlin reasoned that it
was irrelevant whether a state of martial law existed or not, since the
Governor had no judicial power to delegate and the Military Governor
32. The interdepartmental negotiations are outlined in the record of the Dun-
can case, particularly in the testimony of Governor Stainback of Hawaii.
33. Federal judge Metzger and the military authorities have differed over
whether the privilege of the writ was suspended after the order, Judge Metzger
holding that it was not. Armstrong, Martial Law in Hawaii (1943) 29 A. B. A. J.
698, 699.
34. For an elaborate account of martial law in Hawaii and particularly of the
Glockner and Seifert controversy, see Armstrong, Martial Law in Hawaii (1943)
29 A. B. A. J. 698.
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could therefore exercise none; and that martial law itself gave no such
discretion since there was no military necessity for trial of such an of-
fense in the military courts. He emphasized strongly that the civil courts,
except for the limitations of the outstanding orders discussed below,
were open for business.35
Duncan was a civilian worker employed in the Navy Yard at Hono-
lulu. On February 24, 1944, he engaged in a fight with two armed sen-
tries at the yard, was arrested, and was tried by a provost court. In that
trial he denied the allegations of drunkenness and in substance claimed
self-defense. He was given a sentence of six months at hard labor. Subse-
quently Duncan petitioned for habeas corpus in the court of Federal
Judge Metzgir. The writ was granted and Duncan is now at large on his
own recognizance pending appeal. In the trial of the case, Duncan con-
ceded that the suspension of habeas corpus on December 7, 1941, was
justified, but contended that martial law could no longer legally exist.
In any case he claimed that there was no justification for a military court
in cases such as his. The Government's answer denied that there was no
longer a necessity for military courts and recited in great detail the inter-
departmental agreement of February 1943 described below, which was
approved by both the President and the Governor. Reliance on this
agreement, with its related papers, is virtually the heart of the Govern-
ment's case. The Government emphasized that the naval yard at which
the alleged assault occurred kvas a major naval base. Substantially iden-
tical affidavits by Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson were offered
asserting that Hawaii "now is and since December 7, 1941 has been" an
actual theater of war, in "imminent danger of invasion," and that the
public safety requires the suspension of habeas corpus and the imposition
of martial law.
Governor Stainback testified that there had been nothing to keep the
courts from sitting since December 8, 1941,.that he as a federal judge had
conducted a murder trial on that day, that there was no imminent danger
of invasion, and that there had been no such danger since the Battle of
Midway. He emphasized that the military's desire to keep labor controls
was the principal reason for continuing military government.
Judge Metzger, in deciding for the petitioner, reasoned that the
questions to be decided were whether a provost court had jurisdiction to
convict a civilian for an offense against naval personnel on a naval
reservation and whether the office of military governor existed at the
time of the appointment of the provost court. He noted that the military
forces could have had any legislation they wished from Congress and
35. The facts are sketchy because the record in this case at the time of prep-
aration of this article was not available.
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suggested that they turn there for necessary authority. He concluded that
none of the Washington conferees in 1943 had authority to create or con-
tinue martial law. Under the law, martial law "ceases and becomes un-
lawful as soon as the civil government is capable and willing to resume
its normal functions." Presidential approval is not required for revoca-
tion, nor could the act of 1900, passed at time of slow communication
between the Islands and the mainland, have a different intent. The
Judge found that "at all times during the year 1943 and continuing to this
day" the civil government was capable and ready to operate and that on
March 2, 1944, Oahu, the island on which Honolulu is located, was not
in imminent danger of invasion. He concluded that martial law did not
lawfully exist, particularly after March 10, 1943, and thaf the office of
military governor was without lawful creation and bad no authority.
One fact about these cases is vital to an understanding of their legal
significance: Martial law is a legal concept which permits of division.
There is a basic distinction between qualitative and punitive or absolute
martial law. 6 The former term is used when troops are called out, when
some civil functions are taken over by the military-as for example, the
function of arrest-and the latter is used when all civilian government,
including operation of the courts, is suspended.31 Arrest and temporary
detention are not the same as conviction and sentence. Qualified martial
law involves the former and punitive martial law the latter power. The
former acts are subject to civil review before great harm is done, since
the civil courts retain the power to set the individual at liberty when the
question of conviction and sentence arises; but where the military serves
not only as its own police force and jailer, but as its judge and jury too,
civil review is completely excluded. One type of martial law may be
justified where the other is not. Even these are not black and white
categories for the principal measure of martial law in a given situation is
necessity. "Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its exercise, and
necessity measures the extent and aegree to which it may be employed. '13 8
The Duncan and White cases involve punitive martial law in which
the issue is the validity of prison sentences levied by military courts which
in the White case particularly purport to be enforcing the law of the
Territory. The cases do not involve suspension of the writ for the pur-
pose of permitting preventive custody. Even the Milligan majority rec-
ognizes that under some circumstances suspension of the writ for pur-
poses of preventive custody may be proper when at the same time
36. For a history of the development of these types of martial law in the
United States, see RANKIN, WHEN Civm LAW FA_.s (1939).
37. For discussion, see WIENER, A PRAcrCA. MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW
(1940) 11.
38. Id. at 16.
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military courts can not legally function. A court may hold that in time of
insurrection an executive can suspend the writ so as to hold the ring
leaders in custody and still not be authorized to direct their trial by mili-
tary commissions when the courts are open.2 9 The distinction in this liti-
gation is vital. Note, for example, the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas in Hirabayashi v. United States,40 in which he voted to allow the
temporary detention and transfer of a group where necessity for speed
prevented individual hearing of cases, and yet implied that these people
were entitled to eventual hearing.41
TIIE ADMINISTRATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Martial law when it governs a population for two and a half years
is the foundation of a social system. Military government of this kind is
no fleeting display of uniformed power seeking to control a military
calamity. It is a system of law making and law administration which
basically directs the life of a people. The Duncan and White cases inso-
far as they involve general legal principles should not be considered in a
factual vacuum. The social system which the military authorities have
created or preserved must be known if one is to understand as a practical
matter the "necessity" of martial law.
After December 7, 1941, military control was extended to every
aspect of civil life. It governed not only the courts, but municipal affairs,
operation of taxis, rent control, garbage disposal, house numbering, traf-
fic, labor, press censorship, civilian defense, health, jails, prices, liquor,
food control, transportation, gas rationing, and almost everything else'
under the Hawaiian sun.4 2 At very few of these responsibilities did the
military authorities show any great degree of either skill or judgment.
High military officials were readily amenable to the persuasive blandish-
ment of Island society and, as will be shown, the bulk of the military
control program was of a sort more satisfactory to local business than to
any other group in the Islands' population 3
One of the military's experiments was its attempt to encourage food
production. Due to shipping shortages, the Territory has a basic problem
in wartime in supplying itself with food, particularly vegetables normally
brought from the mainland. One method of increasing vegetable pro-
39. Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914).
40. 320 U. S. 81, 93 (1943).
41. The Duncan and White cases are thus unlike Ex parte Zimmerman, 132
F. (2d) 442 (1943), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the detention of a person in
Hawaii.
42. Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii (1943) 31 CAL-IF. L. REV. 477, 479. An
earlier article by Anthony is also helpful: Martial Law in Hawaii (1942) 30 CA.F.
L. REV. 371.
43. See BARBER, HAWAII: RESTLESS RaPART (1941) c. 3, for a discussion of
the Big Five's methods of "selling" the Islands to strangers.
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duction would be to cut down on pineapple and sugar acreage, using these
lands for more immediate purposes. General Emmons appointed as di-
rector of food production, Walter F. Dillingham, member of one of
the Big Five families. One of the first decisions of the new Food
Director was to oppose all efforts to take land from the pineapple and
sugar industries for food production.
Perhaps the most serious problem of the Islands was inflation. The
flush of government money was felt in all its force. Honolulu became
a boom town. Merchants, jewelers, amusement place operators, and
others made stupendous profits. One result was a tremendous growth in
the middle class. Another was a sharp rise in prices. The military au-
thorities met this situation by an attempted price control, which was a
failure until OPA took over the job, and by a wage freeze for employees
in the Islands. Thus the employees were caught, with prices on the
rise and wages relatively stable.44
On December 1, 1942, Mr. Garner Anthony, Attorney General of
Hawaii, submitted a report to the recently appointed Governor, Ingram
M. Stainback.45 The following paragraphs describe the practical opera-
tion of the military's "judicial" system as seen by Mr. Anthony:
"In place of the criminal courts of this Territory there have been erected
on all the islands provost courts and military commissions for the trial of all
manner of offenses from the smallest misdemeanor to crimes carrying the
death penalty. Trials have been conducted without regard to whether or not
the subject matter is in any manner related to the prosecution of the war.
These military tribunals are manned largely by army officers without legal
training. Those who may have had any training in the law seem to have for-
gotten all they ever knew about the subject.
"Lawyers who appear before these tribunals are frequently treated with
contempt and suspicion. Many citizens appear without counsel; they know,
generally speaking, that no matter what evidence is produced the 'trial' will
result in a conviction. An acquittal before these tribunals is a rare animal.
Accordingly, in most cases d. plea of guilty is entered in order to avoid the
imposition of a more severe penalty. Those who have the temerity to enter
a plea of not guilty are dealt with more severely for having chosen that course.
"The accused is not furnished with a copy of the charge against him but
is permitted to examine the prosecutor's copy. Trials take place in crowded
44. Many of the facts throughout this portion of the text are drawn from
discussions with impartial observers who have been in the Islands since the in-
auguration of the military regime.
45. This report has been given general distribution. Stainback, a former
federal judge, succeeded Governor Poindexter in August, 1942. Governor Stain-
back went to the Islands in 1912 and for years, as a ,practicing lawyer and as a
Government official during the Wilson and Roosevelt Administrations, was almost
the sole powerful opponent of the Big Five's rule. He leads the fight in Hawaii
for complete restoration of civil government, a fight in which he has had the
support of the Democratic Party in Hawaii.
MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII
courtrooms in which the officers in charge are fully armed. The witnesses
are brought before the provost judges en masse .and stand in a circle about
the bench together with the accused. The assemblage tells the judge their
views of the matter. Cross-examination of witnesses is tolerated with none
too much patience by the court.
"There have been instances in which arrests have been made and the
accused kept in jail three or four days awaiting trial, even in' the case of
comparatively minor offenses. With the writ of habeas corpus suspended the
unfortunate accused in such cases is without remedy.
"The 'military governor' has appointed what he styles a coordinator of
courts. At the present time this is Captain Edward N. Sylva, who was for-
merly one of the deputies in this office. I am informed that as cases come in
Mr. Sylva makes a determination whether or not they should be tried by the
courts of the land or tried before the military tribunals. His determination
is final.
"The proceedings in these military tribunals are not only shocking to a
lawyer but to anyone with a sense of fair play. Severe and bizarre sentences
are meted out by persons untrained in the law. The feeling of the public is
that they are guilty before they step inside the courtroom and their main
problem is to escape with as light a sentence as possible."
The press has been censored without any regard to the non-military
nature of the matters controlled. For example, the press was not per-
mitted to publish news of local crimes or to discuss the control of prosti-
tution. An editorial mildly criticizing the military administration in one
newspaper brought forth a prompt reprimand for the editor and notifica-
tion that such criticism would not be tolerated by the self-styled Military
Governor.
In the Duncan case, Governor Stainback, in the course of testimony
asserting that martial law was utterly unnecessary and illegal, declared
that the principal reason for retaining martial law was the desire by some
persons to perpetuate the system of labor control instituted under it.
This is probably the prime reason why martial law has lasted so long.
Administration of labor problems by the military is therefore worth care-
ful consideration.
46
As has been shown above, union membership in Hawaii under Big
Five anti-labor practices was very small in 1935, and had grown to about
10,000 in December 1941. Thereafter, membership fell to about 4,000 as
a result of the general confusion and the insecurity of persons of Japa-
nese descent. A rise in union membership then began which, according
to some reports, has now reached almost 20,000. This rise has been
46. Hawaii currently has a population of about 450,000 people, of whom 210,-
000 are employed. Approximately 150,000 of the employed persons are engaged in
non-agricultural work. About half of this number are still under the control of
the military authorities. Of this group, about 63,000 are employees of the Army
and the Navy.
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fought all along the line, and the military labor policies have made sound
unionization particularly difficult.
On December 20, 1941, General Order No. 38 was issued, freezing
jobs and wages. On January 26, 1942, General Order No. 56 created a
director of labor control, a position to which a civilian plantation man-
ager was appointed. On March 31, 1942, General Order No. 38 was
revoked and General Order No. 91 was issued making some wage adjust-
ments on Government projects; requiring a 48-hour week on war proj-
ects, with time and a half for work over 48 hours; continuing a substan-
tial job freeze; requiring that employees with frozen jobs report for work
regularly; and setting up an appeals agency for employees discharged
with prejudice. On May 6, 1942, General Order No. 91 was amended to
permit some relief from the wage freeze, but there was no substantial
improvement in conditions. Subsequently, a 40-cent minimum wage was
ordered which had very little consequence in a territory already in the
grip of inflation. As of March 1, 1943, there were still 110,000 workers
frozen in their jobs.
Any resemblance between these labor controls and those applied on
the mainland are more superficial than real. The wage and job freeze
not only preceded those of the mainland, but were surrounded with none
of the safeguards of individual rights applied on the continent. The
freezes were established not after consultation with the workers involved
but by fiat, and no genuine machinery was established for the alleviation
of hardships. As recently as the summer of 1944, when War Labor Board
Chairman Davis'went to Hawaii, the first steps were still being taken to
establish any agency which could effectively adjust wage inequities to
meet a rising cost of living. In Hawaii, a wage and job freeze was in truth
a perpetuation of every traditional injustice. But greater than all other
differences was the fact that in Hawaii alone has the violation of job
freeze orders been enforced by prison sentences levied by military courts.
The Labor Control Board established by the military authorities to
hear the appeals of employees discharged with prejudice was virtually
moribund. Headed by a succession of plantation executives, it was always
so heavily stacked in favor of employers that few ever supposed that it
would function impartially and almost no cases were brought to it.47
At the same time, the prison population rose as the military courts
vigorously enforced the job freeze by jailing any employees who did not
report for work. These cases were tried with as little regard for consti-
tutional process as would be expected from the description above of the
provost courts. In 1943, the number of such cases rose to about 80 a
month. As recently as the spring of 1944, residents of Honolulu were
47. See note 44 supra, and consider the actual cases described infra.
MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII
accustomed to seeing in their newspapers such headlines as, "Five
Charged with Absenteeism Jailed by Lt. Col. Newkirk," or "Three Fined
$100," or stories to the effect that "having failed to work regularly and
faithfully" an employee had been given one month in jail. In addition
to these military controls, the Honolulu police "vag squad" was per-
mitted to assist in enforcement of labor orders by certain techniques all
its own.
Despite these strenuous methods, it is the opinion of persons ac-
quainted with the Islands that labor outside the military jurisdiction had
a better record on absenteeism than the labor force subject to military
control.
The sugar and pineapple industries have had their own labor prob-
lems. War work drained many of their employees away, and the number
of employees in the sugar fields declined. The Big Five met the situation
by striking a bargain under which the plantation workers would be loaned
to the military establishments from time to time, particularly in off
seasons, with the plantation owfiers continuing to pay their wages and
furnish living quarters and supplies. The owners were reimbursed by
the military for these expenditures, and whether the plantation owners
had profited unduly by this method of selling the service of their em-
ployees is not yet clear.
On March 10, 1943, by joint proclamations of the Commanding
General and the Governor, certain jurisdiction over labor matters was re-
linquished to the civil government. The method of division chosen, based
on the degree of military interest in the particular establishment, had the
effect of splitting territorial labor through the middle, giving divided con-
trol and keeping employees in particular industries separated. 48 The mili-
tary handled the employee complaints by doing little or nothing about
them. Hawaiian labor, fearful of public opinion because of iabor's multi-
racial composition and keenly conscious of the importance of the work
in which it was engaged, felt bound not to strike by the no-strike pledge,
and therefore had no recourse. Principal complaints were against the
Hawaiian Electric Company and the Honolulu Transit Company.49 The
Hawaiian unions have complained frequently concerning alleged violence
done their organizers by military officials. Three major A. F. of L.
unions issued a memorandum in the spring of 1944, alleging that on the
48. For example, of sixteen contracting establishments formerly under military
jurisdiction, seven were relinquished to civilian control. Thirteen out of eighteen
hospitals and eleven out of fifteen laundries were also relinquished.
49. On February 18, 1943, the National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
distributed in Honolulu and to officials of the Federal Government a mimeo-
graphed complaint concerning the impasse in which it found itself with the
Hawaiian Electric Company, where it had overwhelmingly won an election as
collective bargaining representative but with whom it was impossible to come to
any agreement on union security, wages, or grievance procedure.
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Island of Kauai the lieutenant colonel in charge caused the arrest of the
union head of the Longshoremen's local, and held him for six months.
He was subsequently released under longshoremen's pressure, but mean-
while the union was crushed. It also was asserted that the military forbade
the collection of dues for ten months among cannery workers on the Is-
land, resulting in the death of the union. On another island a civilian
employee of Military Intelligence allegedly successfully dissuaded a num-
ber of sugar workers from joining a union. This employee was subse-
quently discharged by the Army but the local Military Intelligence officer,
brother of the plantation manager, issued a statement praising his work.
The most recent incident of this type was a report in the Honolulu press
in March 1944, of a complaint by the C.I.O. that when five of its organ-
izers visited one of the smaller islands they were forcibly expelled by the
major installed as provost marshal, and told to report to their local draft
boards.
The biggest labor case decided by the Labor Control Board is known
as the Tuna Packers decision, decided in January 1944. This case in-
volved a controversy between the Marine Engineers and Drydock Work-
ers and the Hawaiian Tuna Packers, which does Navy repair work.
Issues were maintenance of membership, voluntary check-off, a labor
management committee, and wages. The Military Governor referred the
case to the Labor Control Board. The Military Governor at first refused
to allow the union to be represented by its regular leaders, insisting on
company employees, but he later reversed himself. The panel, without
regard to the practices of the National War Labor Board, held that the
Military Governor had complete jurisdiction over labor disputes whether
or not they were submitted for arbitration. It rejected maintenance of
membership as "incompatible with the war program." It declared that
the check-off would be illegal. The panel rejected the labor management
committee, saying that management had the basic responsibility for the
war program which "can neither be divided between a company and a
union, nor can it be abridged by reason of existence of a management-
labor committee or by anything else."
Honolulu newspaper reports for January 28 contained the reactions
to the opinion. The general manager of Tuna Packers said: "In all im-
portant aspects, the company's position has been sustained and the de-
mands of the union rejected. We are pleased that the controversy has
been settled. . .".. The union said: "In spite of this raw deal, the mem-
bers of our union at Hawaiian Tuna Packers will continue their all-out
war production, though their morale must be severely tried. They know
that this war must be won at the earliest possible moment so that democ-
racy can be reestablished throughout the world."
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It is not difficult to understand why the desire to retain the labor
control is said to be the chief reason for the existence and the continu-
ance of martial law and why spokesmen for the Big Five have endorsed
it. On December 27, 1942, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, in tele-
grams to the President and other government officials, expressed its sat-
isfaction with martial law. The Honoluht Advertiser has expressed a
similar view. 0
THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE Dzuxan AND White CASES
The great issue in the Duncan and White cases is whether,a state
of martial law has been validly declared which has the effect of giving
military courts jurisdiction under the Constitution to try these persons.
This involves three principal questions: (1) Does the Constitution ex-
tend to Hawaii? (2) If so, what is the jurisdiction of the court for cases
of this kind? (3) If the courts had jurisdiction to review the validity of
habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law, are these trials legal?
50. For the intimate relation of the Honolulu press to its principal advertisers
among the Big Five, see BARBER, HAWAII: RESTLEss RAmPART (1941) c. 3.
51. Conceivably either Duncan or White might have been subject to military
jurisdiction even if martial law had not been declared. This is scarcely a serious
possibility as to White whose offense had no relation to the armed forces, but is
arguable as to Duncan who is a civilian naval employee charged with assaulting
a sentry on a naval reservation.
The second Article of War deals with "Persons subject to Military Law"
and includes camp retainers and, in time of war, all "persons accompanying or
serving with the Armies of the United States in the field," both within and with-
out the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. A. W. 2(a), 41 STAT. 787
(1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1473 (1940). For, a general discussion of the scope of this
Article with particular reference to its relation to naval employees, see Shapiro,
Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals of the United States Over Civilians (1924) 12
CALIF. L. REv. 75, 91. This Article has been held to give jurisdiction over a con-
tract surgeon serving with the Army in Texas and over civilian employees at ports
of embarkation in the United States, as well as employees of a contractor engaged
in emergency work for the AEF in France. For discussion see TILLorsoN, ARTi-
CLES OF WAR ANNOATED (1942) 8. Under such holdings, Duncan, had he been
an Army employee, would be subject to punishment under the Articles of War.
However, Duncan was a Navy employee working at a naval reservation and
is charged with assaulting a marine. The Navy has no equivalent authority and
an Act of Congress passed in 1943 giving naval courts wartime martial jurisdic-
tion over certain civilian employees specifically excludes the Hawaiian Islands
"except the islands of Palmyra, Midway, Johnston... ." 57 STAT. 41, 34 U. S. C.
§ 1201 (Supp. 1943). The legislative history of this act clearly shows that Congress
meant to give naval courts jurisdiction only when there were no established civil
courts readily accessible. Letter of Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, H. R. REP. No. 192, 77th Congress,
1st Sess. (1943).
There is a second line of argument excluding the possibility that the Duncan
trial was a court martial under the Articles of War. Under Article of War 4,
A. W. 4, 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1475 (1940), a marine officer such
as the person who sat as provost marshal in the Duncan case is not eligible to
serve in a court martial. While Duncan might be said to have waived his privi-
lege under Article 18 to object to such a court, assuming that this was a court
martial under the Articles of War, it is unthinkable that such a waiver could op-
erate in a case where the court never purported to function under the Articles of
War but rather to be based on martial law.
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Does the Constitittion apply? Section 5 of the Hawaiian Organic Act,
provides that "The Constitution and, except as is herein otherwise pro-
vided, all the laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable,
shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as else-
where in the United States: . . ."52 Section 67 authorizes the Governor
"in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, or when
the public safety requires it [to] suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial
law. . . ."53 It is the contention of Col. Archibald King of the Judge
Advocate General's office that, admitting that the course adopted in the
Islands is in conflict with the principles of the Milligan decision, the Con-
stitution, and hence the decision, do not, to the extent that these activities
are in conflict with the Milligan decision, apply in the Islands. 4 His theory
is that Section 5 and Section 67 must be construed together; and that
therefore Section 67 must be considered a modification of Section 5.
Since Colonel King is one of the top officials of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's office, his view cannot be considered unofficial and the position he
takes warrants careful analysis since it may be considered the basis of the
entire War Department position.
The King argument is that familiar principles of statutory construc-
tion require that two sections of the same act be construed in harmony
with each other. In another context he emphasizes that Congress in
adopting Section 67 was merely including Article 31 of the constitution
of the former republic of Hawaii and that under Article 31, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii had recently held flatly in conflict with the Milligan de-
cision.55 Fairman also emphasizes that Section 67 was adopted after and
presumably in the light of .this decision. 6 As a matter of logic it is ob-
vious that Section 5 can be interpreted as modifying Section 67 instead of
the other way around and while the usual rule is that the explicit will be
considered as modifying the general, the applicability of that rule in any
given case must be determined in the light of the legislative history of
the statute and the decisions which interpret it. In this instance both the
decisions and the legislative history of the act appear to require the con-
clusion that Section 5 is a modification of Section 67 and that martial
law and the suspension of habeas corpus are legal in Hawaii only to the
extent that they would be legal in any other part of the United States. It
is thus unnecessary to face the question of whether Congress could legally
limit the scope of the Constitution in Hawaii. 7
52. 31 STAT. 141 (1900), 48 U. S. C. §495 (1940).
53. 31 STAT. 153 (1900), 48 U. S. C. §532 -(1940).
54. King, Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii (1942) 30 CALIF. L. REv. 599,
626 et seq.
55. In re Kalanianaole, 10 Hawaii 29 (1895).
56. FA MnAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943) 240.
57. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
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Section 5 of the Organic Act finds its general origin in the language
of the Joint Resolution of Annexation which took effect in July 1898.
The Organic Act was introduced in the same term of Congress but it was
not until the next Session, that it was acted upon.58 The House report
on the bill in the 56th Congress stated that Section 5 was included to
avoid any possible question that the Constitution extended to Hawaii. It
stated further that Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes would give the
same result but that the clause had been included out of an abundance of
caution. Section 1891, a general statute similar to Section 5, was then in
the laws of eight of the territories in the continental United States.59 It is
obvious that Congress meant to apply a well-established general principle
by its establishment of Section 5 in a form which customarily meant
exactly what it said without any modification at all.
The Senate discussion of the bill, though extremely lengthy, does not
shed any light on the meaning of clauses under consideration. In the
House, Representative Knox, the Republican leader for the bill, stated
that: "This bill, in so many words, extends the Constitution to Hawaii;
so that there has not been practically a moment of time since the Hawai-
ian Islands were annexed to the United States that the Constitution has
not been the standard by which all the laws of that country must be
measured. . . . The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
will be equally operative in Hawaii as in any portion of the United States
as to any constitutional right which he possesses."60 Representative D. E.
Armond moved to strike the phrase extending the Constitution on the
ground it was superfluous. Knox -supported the clause. The discussion
shows that it was contemplated that the Hawaiians should have every
constitutional right compatible with territory status. They were to be ex-.
cluded only from such rights as voting for president.61
The decisions support the interpretation of the legislative history
that the Organic Act made the Constitution fully applicable in Hawaii.
The leading case in point is Hawaii v. Mankichi.62 In that case the Court
held five to four that the Constitution did not apply in Hawaii for the
purpose of requiring grand jury and petit jury in criminal cases between
1898-1900. The four dissenting justices held that the Constitution ap-
plied in full force in Hawaii from 1898 on. Two of the majority justices
58. The Joint Resolution authorized the appointment of a commission com-
posed of Hawaiian and continental members to prepare an organic act. The re-
port of this commission recommended § 5 and § 67 (numbered § 69 in the com-
mission's draft) in substantially their present form. SEN. Doc. No. 16, 55th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1899). The report of the commisgion contains nothing significant bear-
ing (n the question under consideration here.
59. H. R. REP. 305, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900) 10.
60. 33 CoNG. REc. 3704, 3709 (1900). (Emphasis added).
61. 33 CONG. REc. 3800 (1900).
62. 190 U. S. 197 (1903).
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held that the Constitution applied only from 1900 on. The remaining ma-
jority justices held that prior to 1900 the Constitution was not applicable
in any except major matters, for which they gave as an example, "munici-
pal statutes of Hawaii . . . depriving a person of liberty by the will of
the legislature. '63 Justice Harlan, dissenting, quoted the Milligan case at
length by way of showing that trial by jury was preserved for Hawaii by
the Constitution." The several opinions in the Mankichi case made its
conclusion confusing. But for purposes of the present Hawaiian
problem the statement by Justice White in his concurring opinion fairly
puts the rule of the case: By the Act of 1900 "the Islands were un-
doubtedly made a part of the United States in the fullest sense."0 5 The
majority opinion was given this interpretation by Justice Brown, its au-
thor, and Justice White in subsequent decisions.60
The legislative history and the cases thus show that Section 5 makes
the Constitution fully applicable in Hawaii and that Section 67 must be
read in the light of that fact. It is fair to argue further that Congress
by adopting these sections meant to adopt the Milligan rule as setting
the sole basis for martial law and the suspension of the writ. The Milli-
gan rule stated the permissible extent of martial law and suspension of
the writ as Congress knew the Constitution in 1900. If it can be argued
that Congress could not have intended by Section 67 to have authorized
the unconstitutional, it may be concluded that the Organic Act authorizes
martial law subject to the limitations of the Milligan case and no more. In
other words, it may be said that the outstanding constitutional decision
as to the permissible'extent of martial law in 1900 was the Milligan case
and Congress in adopting Section 67 carried with it all the Milligan
limitations on martial law.67
It is always difficult to determine whether Congress in general lan-
guage meant to assume the continuing validity of a constitutional decision
or whether it meant its statute to occupy any new ground which subse-
quent interpretations of the Constitution might permit. This question
must be resolved case by case. However, doubts as to Congressional in-
tent should be resolved in the light of recent acts of Congress which care-
fully* preserve the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Every evidence from
such statutes indicates that the current Congress at least wants to pre-
serve the jurisdiction of the civil courts wherever possible.08
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id. at 245.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Carter v. Gear, 197 U. S. 348, 355 (1905) ; Rasmussen v. United States,
197 U. S. 516, 535 (1905).
67. See Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitution, supra at 599.
68. 56 STAT. 173 (1942), 18 U. S. C. § 97(a) (1943), authorizes military offi-
cials to make necessary regulations for military areas, violations of which are
punishable by penalty in the civil courts. This statute is basis enough for all
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Jurisdiction of the Court. it is customarily argued in cases in which in-
dividuals attempt to test the validity of the imposition of martial law or
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus that the courts have little or
no jurisdiction-that the executive department is the sole judge of the
necessity of martial law and the validity of the acts done under it. This is
not the law. It is true that a number of cases, particularly in state courts,
look in this direction; but these cases are either in conflict with Supreme
Court decisibns or have been limited in their own jurisdictions.
The argument for excluding the courts from jurisdiction is put thus
by King: "The decision and action of the executive pursuant to the emer-
gency provisions formerly in the Constitution of Hawaii and now in the
Organic Act are final and conclusive." 69 The basic proposition in such a
view is that a court can do no more than determine whether martial law
is validly declared or, in the case of suspension of the writ, that the writ
has been legally suspended.70 There its power ends. It may be taken
without further discussion that the executive cannot close the courts to
the extent of forbidding all habeas corpus review. This was attempted
by the President in the Saboteur case and was flatly rejected in EX parte
Quirin.7 1
King, to support his argument for exclusion of comprehensive judi-
cial review, relies principally on eight cases, all of which either fall short
of proving the point attributed to them or have no force.72 The cases
which lend most comfort to his positions 3 are labor cases in which mar-
necessary military regulations in Hawaii. The Act of March 22, 1943, described
supra note 51, carefully extends naval military court jurisdiction over civilians only to
areas in which civil courts are not functioning, and with equal care excludes
Hawaii from such jurisdiction.
69. King, supra note 54, at 618.
70. The Civil War cases go to this point-who can suspend the writ?-and
hence are irrelevant here. E.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487
(C. C. Md. 1861); In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 382 (1863).
71. 317 U. S. 1, 25 (1942) : "Neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they
are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions
that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted for-
bid their trial by military commission."
72. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909) ; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849);
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U. S. 1827) ; Ex parte Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 91 Pac.
738 (1905) ; In re Kalanianaole, 10 Hawaii 29 (1895) ; In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57
Pac. 706 (1899) ; Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905) ; Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W.
Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914) ; Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913) ;
State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912). King might fairly have added
two contemporary English cases, Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206, and
Greene v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs, id. at 284. The Liversidge and
Greene cases are contemporary English holdings that, under a wartime statute and
the resultant order in council, a person may be restrained upon order of the Home
Secretary and, in substance, that the scope of the Court's review is limited to a de-
termination that the order was made. This is a far cry from earlier English decisions
such as Wolf Tone's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 613 (K. B. 1798). It is significant, how-
ever, that these cases make the point that the restraint is preventive rather than (as
in the Duncan and White cases) punitive.
73. Such as the Boyle, Moyer, and Hatfield cases, supra note 72
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tial law was torn out of its normal province in the law of war and applied
to support one side in the vigorous strikes that marked labor's flexing of
its muscles in the period between 1900 and the World War. If these
cases are to be considered as of any weight, the military forces today
must carry the burden of showing the relevance of the attitude of state
governors and courts in the early Twentieth Century toward labor unions
to the second World War.
Martin v. Mott 74 holds that the executive has unreviewable authority
to call.'out the militia, a point not in issue here, and Luther v. Borden7"
holds that his decision as to the necessity of martial law will not be re-
viewed. As will be shown in' the discussion of Sterling v. Constantin,70
this is not the same as an exemption of the executive from review of par-
ti cilar acts performed once martial law is declared. These cases might
have been pushed to the point that King suggests, but this development
is foreclosed by later opinions. The same is true of Moyer v. Peabody,
in which Justice Holmes, upholding martial law in an Idaho strike, used
needlessly broad language, saying, "Public danger warrants the substitu-
tion of executive process for judicial process." 77 The generality of this
decision was specifically disavowed in the Constantin decision.78
- The West Virginia decisions, under which martial law was made the
basis of military trials of hundreds of striking workmen, were based on
the theory that a governor might declare that a state of war existed and
thereafter be liable for abuses only by impeachment. 79 These decisions
have been strongly criticized in West Virginia,80 have been modified",
there, and have not been followed elsewhere. They are so obviously in
conflict with the Constantin decision as to be of no weight.
The Kalanianaole case82 involved an insurrection against the newly
formed Republic in behalf of the monarchy only eighteen months after the
establishment of the Republic. Under martial law about' 200 people were
tried by military commissions for misprision of treason. The Court held
that the President of the Republic's decision as to necessity was not re-
viewable, openly rejecting the Milligan argument. The opinion is elab-
orately stated but so obviously is aimed to serve purposes of state rather
74. 12 Wheat. 19 (U. S. 1827).
75. 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849).
76. 287 U. S. 378 (1932).
77. 212 U. S. 78,-85 (1909).78. 287 U. S. 378, 400 (1932).
79. Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914) ; Ex parte Jones,
71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913) ; State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E.
243 (1912).
80. See the strong dissenting opinions of Robinson, J., in cases cited in note 79
supra, and address of Win. G. Mathews, President, West Virginia Bar Association,
SEN. Doc. No. 230, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) 5846.
81. Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S. E. 428 (1921).
82. 10 Hawaii 29 (1895).
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than to determine the law that it has little value as a precedent. The
Court candidly admits that military commissions were essential because
Hawaiian juries would never have convicted the defendants. 83 The Re-
public was new and was foisted on the natives through revolution by a
small ruling American group which could not have kept its seat without
dictatorial methods.
The basic American decisions are to the effect that the courts may
review suspension of the writ or declarations of martial law to the extent
required to determine whether a particular act taken by the military au-
thorities was in fact necessary and legal."' In Ex parte Milligan,'the
Court held that: "The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of
course; and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party
applying is denied the right of proceeding any further with it."' 5 The
Court, on this understanding, proceeded to review the necessity for the
proceeding of the military commission and found it invalid. In EX parte
Quirin, the Court similarly held that it had jurisdiction to review the
legality of the proceedings by the military commission, though in that
case the issue of necessity was not squarely involved.
This problem was clearly before the Court in Sterling v. Constantin.
There the governor of Texas had declared martial law in the oil fields
for the purpose of enforcing certain oil controls which were of doubtful
legality under existing decisions. The district court enjoined the gov-
ernor from interfering with lawful production, and the Supreme Court
affirmed in a unanimous opinion by Chief justice Hughes. The district
court examined into the basis of the governor's procedure and found as
a fact that there was no war or insurrection. The Supreme Court held
that it was not barred by the executive determination from reviewing the
basic facts. If not, "it is manifest thai the fiat of a state governor, and
not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of
the land. .. ."81 The Court, relying on the Milligan decision, held that
the governor has exclusive authority to determine whether military action
is required to cause the laws to be faithfully executed and to decide
whether the militia must be called up, and that there is a wide range of
executive discretion as to the actions to be taken, but "what are the allow-
83. Id. at 63. This counter-revolution is described in PRATr, ExPANSIONISTS
OF 1898 (1936) c. VI.
84. See. on a related point, Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134 (U. S.
1852), holding that private property of a citizen may be taken in wartime upon a
declaration of military necessity, but that in determining liability the Court will
review the necessity of the taking, measuring the facts from the point of view of
the officer who acted.
85. 4 Wall. at 130-131.
86. 287 U. S. 378, 397 (1932).
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able limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions. 87
Many state and lower federal court decisions also uphold the view
that the military discretion is subject to judicial review.8 8
In the light of these cases it may be concluded that the court has
jurisdiction to determine "whether the invasion of interests normally pro-
tected was, under the circumstances, arbitrary and in excess of the occa-
sion,"8 9 for "where necessity is absent, measures of martial law may not
legally be used."' 0
This is not to say that the military and executive decisions will be
treated lightly or be subject to review de novo. "Where, as they did
here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and
for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which
the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for
any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its
judgment for theirs."' 1 The judicial review, however, should do more
than determine, as in the case of the normal administrative finding,
whether mere substantial evidence exists to support the executive deci-
sion. Here some presumption against restraints on civil liberty may ap-
ply.92
Were these military trials constitutionol? If it is concluded that the
Constitution applies to Hawaii and that the courts have a duty to deter-
mine the necessity of the suspension of the civil courts, the question re-
mains whether the suspension of those cburts was unnecessary and the
,trials by military tribunal illegal.
87. Id. at 401.
88. United States. v. Philips, 33 F. Supp. 261 (N. D. Okla. 1940) ; Miller v.
Rivers, 31 F. Supp. 540 (M. D. Ga. 1940); Powers Merc. Co. v. Olson, 7 F.
Supp. 865 (D. C. Minn. 1934); Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164
(1916) ; Allen v. Okla. City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.(2d) 1054 (1935) ; Hearon v. Calus,
178 S. C. 381, 183 S. E. 13 (1935) ; Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S. E. 428(1921).
89. FAIRMAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1942) 104.
90. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW (1940) 19.
91. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 93 (1943). It should be noted
as extremely important that the Court in the Hirabayashi case carefully distin-
guishes the case from one involving martial law or trial by military tribunal. At 92.
Justice Douglas, concurring, noted that the general orders affecting the Japanese
Americans were subject to ample civil review. At 106. Justice Murphy, concurring,
quoted MilliganI with approval. At 110. Justice Rutledge, concurring, expressly
reserved opinion on the discretion of the executive in suspending habeas corpus. At
114.
92. United States v. Carolene Products, Inc., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). In
determining the extent to which it will review military judgments, the courts will
be sure -to be influenced by the type of consideration which appeared conclusive to
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 871 94
(1905). In that case the court suggested the possibility that the Philippines might
some day be invaded by "one of the thickly populated governments near this
archipelago," which might, "without warning, appear in one of the remote harbors
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The issue here is not whether there is an imminent danger of inva-
sion. In these cases Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson have filed
affidavits and testified that invasion was imminent. Governor Stainback.
testified that invasion was not imminent, and Judge Metzger in his
holding sided with the Governor. However, this is a false issue and
there is 'no necessity for the courts to set themselves up as arbiters of
this factual dispute on a military question. There has been invasion and
the question is, assuming the likelihood of the possibility of a repeti-
tion, to what extent is suspension of the writ and imposition of martial
law justified? It is here that the distinction between qualified and abso-
lute martial law, discussed above, becomes of the sharpest significance.
Qualified martial law may have been justified by the events, but is the
same true of punitive martial law? None of the key phrases of Section
67 of the Organic Act, "imminent danger of invasion," "suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus", and "martial law" have any sharp, clear-cut
meaning. In the light of all the circumstances, how much, if any, sus-
pension of constitutional rights is authorized?3
The Milligan rule is that military trials cannot be tolerated under
the Constitution where the courts are open and can, as a practical mat-
ter, function. Under this rule, as Colonel King concedes, the convic-
tions of Duncan and White are completely unjustified. There is not a
fact in the record of these cases or any fact known to common knowl-
edge which indicates that the civil courts could not have functioned when
these men were convicted. The record shows that as a matter of fact
the courts have been able to function since December 8, 1941. On De-
cember 16, 1941, a substantial portion of their jurisdiction was remitted
to them and this was amplified by General Order 57 on January 27,
1942. There is no reason other than military interference why the
courts could not have functioned at least from December 16, 1941, or
January 27, 1942. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support the
hypothesis that the Hawaiian legal system cannot be trusted to try these
with a powerful fleet and begin to land troops." If someone then, resisting the
suspension of habeas corpus, contended that no invasion actually existed, the
court declared that it would certainly not call the officers in the field away from
their posts of duty to justify suspension of the writ. It is the contention of this
article that no such interference with military activity is necessary for a court to
determine that the military effort to close the civil courts of Hawaii was com-
pletely illegal.
93. The line in the" Milligan decision that "martial law cannot arise from a
threatened invasion" [4 Wall. 2, 127 (U. S. 1866)], has also been emphasized out
of all proportion in discussions of the validity of martial law in Hawaii.' Here
the invasion was not only threatened but real. No one has denied that preventive
arrests in Hawaii on December 8, 1941, would have been upheld. The argument
as to whether the threat had terminated may be discarded as profitless if, as con-
tended in this article, the military' trials are invalid without raising this question.
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cases, particularly one involving a humdrum embezzlement, or that their
judicial processes are any slower than respect for the constitutional
decencies, ignored by the military courts, requires.
Even under the minority opinion in the Milligan case it may be
argued that the trial of civilians by military courts under the circum-
stances kiown to exist in Hawaii was completely illegal. The minority
opinion suggests that Congress has the authority to authorize military
courts when the courts are open if there is a likelihood of insurrection
in the area or when the courts may not be loyal to the government.0 4
No one has ever so much as suggested that the courts of Hawaii are not
completely loyal and there is no evidence at all of a probable insurrec-
tion.
There can be no doubt then that under the Milligan rule the arrest,
trial and punishment of Duncan and White by military tribunals is
utterly and completely illegal. The sole question remaining is whether
the Milligan rule will be followed, or whether, as suggested by the com-
mentators mentioned at the beginning of this article, it is to be dis-
,carded.
The prediction of court actions is a precarious undertaking, but at
least there is nothing in the decisions since 1866 which would indicate
that the Supreme Court will abandon the Milligan rule. There have
been no Supreme Court holdings squarely in point, but the case has been
frequently quoted with approval, and in both the Quirin and Hirabaa i"
decisions, the Court carefully distinguishes the Milligan problem and
reserves the questions raised by it for future decision.
The state cases which have trenched on the Milligan rule can give
little guidance to the Supreme Court. As has been noted, they are for
the most part labor cases in which the state courts have permitted mar-
tial law so that the governor could control strikes.9 5 In the most ex-
treme of the cases and almost the only ones which authorize punitive
martial law and trials of civil offenses by military courts, the labor dis-
putes were particularly severe. 0 The Milligan case has customarily
been claimed as a shield by organized labor in its protests against im-
prisonment by military officials for strike participation. The state cases
dealing with the Milligan rule presented problems of labor relations and
94. Concurring opinion, Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 140-141 (U. S. 1866).
95. The only instance known in which the governor declared martial law to
aid the strikers is Powers Merc. Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. C. Minn. 1934).
96. These are the three West Virginia cases, supra note 79. For a description
of the causes of these strikes and their conduct, see FEDERAL AID Ix DOMESTIc Dis-
TUR"ANCES, SEN. RE'. No. 321, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
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did not involve the application of the war power.9 7 But even in the field
of labor relations many state courts have supported the Milligan rule.98
As has been reiterated in this discussion, the Supreme Court of the
United States has never approved punitive martial law, and has nev~e
upheld a military tribunal in a conviction for a civil offense by a mili-
tary tribunal. Moyer v. Peabody, involves detention but not criminal
prosecution. Only three cases have been discovered in American law
which uphold criminal prosecutions by military courts for violation of
civil laws. 99
It is not odd that so few decisions support what has been done in
Hawaii, for criminal proceedings before military tribunals against civil-
ians for violations of civil law are wholly foreign to American demo4
cratic government and are likely to be so termed by the Supreme, Court.
The basic American policy is that expressed by President Wilson dur-
ing the World War when he was asked to comment on a bill that would
extend martial law throughout the United States. He said: "I am
wholly and unalterably opposed to such legislation, and very much value
the opportunity to say so. I think that it is not only unconstitutional,
but that in character it would put us upon the level of the very people
we are fighting and affecting to despise."' 0 0  Nothing of weight,in
American legal history supports the view that the Supreme Court has
any intention of abandoning one iota of the rule of Ex parte Milligan.
CONCLUSION
From the contract labor, near slavery economy of the Hawaiian
Republic to the provost marshal labor system of World War II is very
little progress indeed in the nation's administration of a territory. We
are told by Hawaii's chief executive, himself an avowed enemy of mar--
tial rule, that the chief excuse for the continuation of martial law is the
desire by some persons to maintain this convenient method of wartime
labor control. It is significant that the attacks on the Milligan decision,
97. The subject of labor relations and martial law is discussed in RANKIIN,
WHEN CIVIL LAW FAnLs (1939). For a history of the use of federal troops in
various disturbances, and the martial law applied in some instances, the basic:
work is SEN. Doc. No. 209, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).
98. RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 97, c. 7; Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454,
143 Pac. 947 (1 14).
99. These are the West Virginia cases, where all the defendants were par-
doned as soon as strike was over, the Kalanianol¢ case, and United States ex rel.
McMasters v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S. D. Tex. 1920), in which a district court
denied habeas corpus to a petitioner jailed for a traffic offense by a military tri-
bunal during a period of martial law in a Galveston strike. The opinion contains
substantially no reasoning. Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S. D. Ind. 1935)
upholds martial law in an Indiana labor dispute but the case involves detentions
only.100. Rankin, op. cit. supra note 97, at 138-139.
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whether in Hawaii in 1944 or in West Virginia in 1914 or in Colorado
in 1906, are all of a piece. They are, under one guise or another, as-
saults on one of the foremost constitutional protections for organized
labor.
But the problem in the instant case far overshadows the relatively
petty issues of labor disputes. As the history of military maladminis-
tration in Hawaii so abundantly shows, the question is: Which shall
rule, caprice or law, generals or civil government; which shall be the
basic document of the American Government, the Manual for Courts
Martial or the Constitution?
The Milligan opinion was written by Justice David Davis, who had
been a circuit judge in Illinois before whom Lincoln had practiced.
Davis managed Lincoln's campaign for the presidential nomination in
1860 and was the administrator of Lincoln's estate. He was appointed
to 'the Supreme Court by Lincoln and served until 1877 when he went
into the Senate. In politics he was an independent liberal, and as sena-
tor he sided sometimes with the Republicans and sometimes with the
Democrats. In 1872 he was nominated by the Independent Labor
party for president on an anti-monopoly ticket, and came close to being
the nominee of the liberal Republicans and Democrats, who eventually
chose Greeley. He combined eastern education and frontier tradition.
He was a very wise man.
